Emergency rules temporarily modifying migration regulation can be seen as natural experiments that can be exploited to assess the effectiveness of migration policies. In 2011, the Italian Government released the North Africa Emergency Provisions (ENA) temporarily relaxing immigration policies for refugees who fled to Italy as a consequence of the Arab Spring and the Libyan civil war. To take advantage of this experimental opportunity, we run difference-in-differences regressions on an original dataset to estimate the effects of the ENA provisions on the probability of obtaining a residence permit. The dataset includes micro-data self-collected from an important charity in Milan (Casa della Carità) which regularly provides migrants with legal assistance so as to help them to comply with immigration rules. Estimates show that such provisions actually increased the number of residence permits released to migrants entitled to the ENA benefits. On the other hand, migrants who were not entitled to these provisions suffered from exacerbated difficulties in complying with standard regulation.
Introduction
Immigration to Italy is a phenomenon that has become relevant in the last few decades and has been largely impacted by the exceptional flux of citizens from countries of North Africa, mostly generated by the civil war in 2011 in Libya and political turmoil (the Arab Spring) in Egypt and the Maghreb (Bonifazi et al. 2009 , de Haas 2008 , Del Boca and Venturini 2005 , Zincone 2006 ).
All migrants in Italy face a number of specific legal and administrative issues. 1 In particular, in order to live legally in the country, migrants are required to hold a residence permit (permesso di soggiorno). Although the latter is an administrative document which can be obtained from public authorities (Police) if migrants satisfy a number of conditions and provide standard documents, common evidence exists that many migrants cannot go through Stateprovided channels in order to comply with migration rules. 2 Milan, the second largest city in Italy, hosts vibrant communities of foreign citizens, representing 19% of the legally resident population at the end of 2012. In the city, Casa della Carità (CdC, hereafter) is an outstanding example of a charity that provides individuals -both Italians and foreign citizens -with free legal assistance. 3 There is evidence that, on the occasion of their arrival to Italy, migrants tend to require not the ordinary residence permits for working, studying and family reasons (even if entitled) but specific types of permits which are intended to manage asylum-seeking procedures (namely, permits for refugees). More specifically, the Italian law (D.lgs. No. 286/1998) establishes three different types of residence permit for foreign citizens seeking refuge. These permits are released by territorial Commissions and each type provides the migrant with a different level of protection. Accordingly, an applicant may alternatively be qualified for the status of refugee ("maximum protection"), for subsidiary protection ("intermediate level") or for humanitarian protection ("minimum level"). Therefore, the condition of an asylum-seeking person is often perceived as a trick to stay in the country for a given time (i.e. the period legally provided for the individual request to be decided by the competent authorities). Such a bias may thus seriously put at risk the "physiology" of applications for residence permits.
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Such kind of difficulties occurred when the Arab Spring and the Libyan civil war broke out, as a large amount of refugees and migrants fled to Italy. The Government responded to the crisis with special measures, declaring a state of emergency.
On April 5, 2011, recognizing the exceptional situation of North Africa, the Government adopted temporary measures of humanitarian protection in favor of refugees from North Africa (ENA). 6 The ENA provisions, in fact, temporarily relaxed immigration policies, and, consequently, migrants who fled from North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) to Italy in the relevant period (January 1 -April 5, 2011) 7 were automatically granted a temporary permit of stay for humanitarian reasons.
8 On August 3, 2011, the duration of this regime was extended due to the persistent situation of instability in North Africa. Some specific emergency measures were lately applied also to migrants from other African countries (the Horn of Africa, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda).
However, as serious difficulties emerged in the handling of the crisis, there is anecdotal evidence that this temporary, special protection was exploited by people who were not eligible for it (for example, this could be the case of individuals who were already illegally in the country).
Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to perform an empirical analysis in order to investigate whether such a situation was likely to occur. Difference-in-differences (diff-in-diffs) estimation provides evidence that this temporary emergency rule obviously increased the number of residence permits released to migrants entitled to the ENA benefits. On the other hand, however, we find that migrants who were not entitled to such provisions suffered from exacerbated difficulties in complying with standard regulation.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the dataset; Section 3 uses diff-in-diffs techniques to estimate the effects of the ENA provisions on various categories of treated groups of applicants for a residence permit and discusses the econometric results. Section 4 concludes and suggests some policy implications.
Data
We use self-collected data from CdC.
9 Data refer to the period January 1, 2010 -March 31, 2013 and were coded using files and other documents filled by operators at CdC. The dataset contains detailed information on a share of the entire population of migrants living in Milan, given that in the period of observation 466 people were provided with legal advice at CdC.
Statistics show an increase in the flux of foreign citizens from Africa in 2011, due to the civil war in Libya and political turmoil in Egypt and the Maghreb (cf. Table 2 ).
As most of the individuals who come into contact with CdC are not Italian citizens (cf. Table 1 ), an important sector of the charitable legal advising activity concerns applications for a residence permit and other problems related to immigration (cf. Table 3 ).
Concerning the rate of success in solving legal and administrative issues of the applicants, data show that 20% of the cases included in the analysis have been solved (cf. Table 4) . 10 Furthermore, there is another 32% of cases that have been classified as situations deemed to be solved (according to the expertise of legal advisors of CdC). As for this, it is important to note that a huge proportion of these "deemed-to-be-solved cases" (44%) refers to applications for humanitarian or subsidiary protection.
Statistics show that the rate of success for residence permit applications improved for African migrants after the ENA provisions. Notably, after the enactment of the ENA regime also non-African migrants seem to have been impacted, although the provisions did not apply to them. In fact, the rate of success for non-African migrants after April 5, 2011 decreased from 64% to 43% (cf. Table 5 ). (1) March 31, 2013. (3) Cases that are unlikely to be favorably solved according to legal expertise by CdC. (4) Dismissed (e.g., the applicant's conduct was not proper according to CdC guidelines). 
The no. of issues is larger than the no. of migrants as some individuals face more than one single problem. (2) Calculated on the total number of individuals (466).

Empirical analysis
The ENA provisions of April 5, 2011 and August 3, 2011 can be viewed as a natural experiment since such decrees granted a temporary residence permit for humanitarian reasons to all refugees who fled from North Africa and other African countries subject to humanitarian emergency. If entitled, applicants received the residence permit according to a streamlined procedure aimed at verifying the necessary requirements. As such, the ENA regime appears to be a good natural experiment since it was implemented after the outbreak of the emergency and only for the migrants who fled to Italy from specific countries subject to humanitarian emergency before the enactment of the rule. Furthermore, the ENA concerned only a specific group of people, who met precise and easily verifiable requirements. Only if these requirements were met, time and administrative steps to obtain the permit were reduced. Likewise, if these conditions were not met, the application was rejected.
To take advantage of this experimental opportunity, we run diff-in-diffs regressions to estimate the effects of the ENA provisions on the probability of obtaining a residence permit.
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We estimate the following regression model:
where i refers to the level of the individual migrant; obtainRP indicates whether a residence permit was accorded; time takes value 1 if the migrant asks for legal assistance from the time the first ENA provision was enacted (April 5, 2011) onwards; whereas entitled is a dummy which equals 1 when the migrant fulfilled the requirements to benefit from the ENA treatment.
12 i x is a ( ) vector of covariates, including date of birth, education, marital status, information regarding the family of origin, regional and country-of-origin fixed effects.
13 All these social variables are likely to grasp a higher degree of vulnerability of some individuals. Accordingly, 4 α is a ( ) vector of parameters associated with these covariates. Dummies for the advisor and the office receiving applicants at the CdC have also been introduced. Finally, we assume that F is the cumulative distribution of a logistic random variable.
14 All summary statistics and variable descriptions are reported in Table 6 . As for the parameters in (1), α 0 and α 1 estimate the effect of the ENA provisions on the control group respectively before and after the treatment. Correspondingly, α 2 and α 3 estimate the effect on the migrants entitled to the application of the provision respectively before and after the treatment.
In Table 7 we report the Logit estimates of (1) where the treated group is represented by North African citizens and people from the Horn of Africa and other countries mentioned in the Presidential Decree of August 3, 2011 (labelled entitled in the tables). However, given the number of assumptions required by nonlinear diff-in-diffs models (see Athey and Imbens, 2006 for a detailed discussion), parallel OLS estimates are also reported in Table 8 for comparison.
In general, results show that the interaction term entitled*time, associated with the effect of the ENA provisions on the group of entitled applicants is always positive and significant. The somehow unexpected result obtained by this analysis, instead, is that after the ENA the probability of obtaining a residence permit dramatically decreases for the control group of migrants (the parameter associated with time is always negative and significant). This confirms what already emerges from the descriptive statistics in the previous section.
In order to provide robust empirical evidence we first need to avoid that the observed pattern is the pure outcome of events other than the ENA provisions affecting people with some characteristics in a different way from people with other characteristics. Political conflicts and adverse environmental conditions in the countries of origin are just an example of such aggregated shocks.
Due to this possibility, we check for the robustness of our hypothesis controlling for measurable features (other than the ENA) which may differently affect the treated and the control group in terms of the probability of obtaining a residence permit during the time period considered in the analysis. In particular, in columns (a) to (e) of each table we report the estimates obtained for five different specifications of (1) corresponding to the progressive inclusion of regional and country fixed effects. In the first specification (column (a)) we omit all fixed effects but the operator and office dummies. In the second specification (column (b)) all regional fixed effects are accounted for, while in column (c) we include regional dummies which do not correspond to regions subject to the ENA provisions. Finally, in column (d) all national fixed effects are included, while in column (e) we include dummies for the country-oforigin except those corresponding to nations subject to the ENA provisions. Regarding the other possible biases which may alter our predictions, we exclude that the ENA enactment may have itself caused changes in the definition of the group of entitled migrants at the aggregate (national) level. In fact, as mentioned above, the ENA rules have been designed in such a way that migrants could not take advantage of these provisions once they had knowledge of their existence. It is not a case, indeed, that the enactment date was April, 5, whereas the relevant time of arrival in Italy required for eligibility was January 1 -April 5, 2011. As a consequence, the ENA enactment should not have, per se, generated an additional inflow of migrants from countries subject to the emergency wishing to exploit these special provisions. Moreover, it is worth noticing that since the ENA residence permits have mostly been granted according to verifiable characteristics (nationality and time of arrival in Italy), the probability of success should not, in principle, depend upon individual unmeasurable traits of the migrant.
Still, however, some migrants could have applied for a residence permit for humanitarian reasons (mostly under the ENA) on the basis of their individual perception regarding the possibility of succeeding, perhaps driven by the euphoria generated by this exceptional situation, whereas they would have applied for ordinary permits in the absence of the ENA provisions. Personal traits may thus have altered the willingness to look for legal advice at CdC, and therefore the composition of the treatment group 15 in our sample compared to the universe of migrants entitled to the ENA. In order to check whether this might have occurred, we have compared the ratio of entitled migrants applying for humanitarian reasons to the overall number of applications for work, study, and humanitarian protection, both at the national level and in our sample. We refer to 2011 since this is the last information available. At the national level we have selected two representative ENA countries, Tunisia and Morocco, which were among the first ten countries in terms of entries in Italy (the remaining eight countries were not subject to the emergency).
National data show that 39.79% of the entries from Tunisia and Morocco related to application for refugee status and humanitarian protection. In the case of our data, 42% of the entitled migrants applied for such type of permits. Hence, anecdotal evidence suggests that individual attitudes are not likely to have influenced the composition of the treated group in our sample compared to a hypothetical treated group defined on the universe of Italian migrants.
Besides this, we also need to verify that our model is robust to the underlying hypotheses of the diff-in-diffs model. The presence of a common trend before the break is unquestionably the most relevant one. However, in our context, such an assumption is rather difficult to test due to the relatively low number of observations which makes the average success rate relatively volatile, no matter the length of the time span in which it is computed. Due to this limit, in Figure 1 we report the success rate in the period surrounding the ENA enactment, when most of the observations are concentrated. The figure provides evidence of the absence of any trend, both in the treated and the control group.
Finally, there is additional interesting evidence from our estimates in relation to the parameters associated with other covariates in Tables 7 and 8 . In particular, being younger and illiterate seems to increases the probability of being accorded a permit. This could be justified by the fact that socially weaker individuals receive more protection. Conversely, having the family in the home country reduces the probability of obtaining a permit, which instead may indicate a major weakness of people who have no network in Italy.
Lastly, it is worth observing that relevant contribution in explaining the variance of the dependent variable is exerted by country-of-origin dummies, as clearly emerges by comparing different values of both the pseudo R2 and R2. As for this, a first explanation may be identified in an unwanted shifting effect: in the face of the emergency, some non-eligible migrants might unsuccessfully have tried to apply for the ENA regime or any another form of international or humanitarian protection.
16 Accordingly, this effect may either be due to lack of information or represent the consequence of "trick" applications. From this point of view, possible policy implications would require better information on the part of public authorities and a more prudential attitude by legal advisors in terms of orienting the applicants.
A second interpretation may simply be attributed to the difficulties connected with the handling of the crisis: the massive flow of newly-arrived migrants from Africa might have somehow jammed the whole administrative system, deteriorating the position of non-African migrants. Thereby, the ENA rules might have had an adverse effect on the functioning of the already overloaded authorities that decided demands for protection. Further research would thus require to focus on the distinction between applicants for "ordinary" residence permits (for working, studying and family reasons) and permits for international or humanitarian protection. In this sense, it should be expected that this peculiar adverse effect had a greater impact on the latter category of applicants.
Finally, a third explanation may be referred to the implementation by public authorities of a tacit policy, aimed at rationing -or, at least, restraining -the amount of residence permits accorded from year to year. Although the Italian government does not explicitly make use of quotas with regard to requests for international or humanitarian protection, there is a possibility that the increase in the number of residence permits accorded to African migrantsdue to the ENA regime and subsequent measures -was counterbalanced by a stricter attitude towards non-African migrants. Further research is needed to shed light on these possible explanations.
